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Against the backdrop of decades of public sector reforms in Europe, 
this essay aims to make sense of the processes through which 
institutions, democratic government included, achieve and lose 
autonomy or primacy and why it is difficult to find a state of 
equilibrium between democratic government and institutional 
autonomy. 
The analytical value of ‘autonomy’ as detachment-from-politics 
and the apolitical dynamics of change assumed by npm reformers 
are challenged. In contrast, the interplay between democratic 
government and institutional autonomy is interpreted as an artifact
of partly de-coupled inter-institutional processes involving struggle 
for power and status among interdependent and co-evolving insti-
tutions that are carriers of competing yet legitimate values, interests 
and behavioral logics. The problem of finding a stable equilibrium 
between democratic government, autonomous agencies and 
non-majoritarian institutions, is illustrated by the cases of public 
administration and the public university. 
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aN oLD IssUE REvIsITED 
All political communities face the challenge: what form of government is normatively best and also 
sustainable? The agenda question is: what is the proper scope of involvement of government in different 
parts of society? What parts of the economy, education, civil society, religion, family life, etc. shall be 
politically governed or guided? What tasks, purposes and responsibilities shall belong to the public realm 
and what inalienable immunities, rights and freedoms shall belong to the private realm? The institutional 
question is: what are the proper forms of government involvement? Through which institutional mechanisms 
and instruments are public authority and power to be expressed and exercised? What should be the 
relations between majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions? When should the majority rule through 
democratic collective decision-making? When should decisions be made by non-majoritarian, ‘guardian’ 
institutions insulated from democratic government and politics, and on what basis should such entities 
make their decisions? 
The answers given to these questions have varied across polities and over time, and this essay addresses
the dynamics of change over time against the backdrop of three decades of public sector reforms in 
Europe. The predominant ‘market-and-management’ trend implies to give administrative agencies more 
independence from majoritarian-based institutions and common sets of rules. Administrative entities have
resumen 
En el contexto de décadas de reformas del sector público en 
Europa, Este ensayo pretende dar sentido a los procesos a través del
cual instituciones, incluido el gobierno democrático, logra y pierde
autonomía o primacía y por qué es difícil encontrar un estado de
equilibrio entre el gobierno democrático y la autonomía institucional. 
El valor analítico de “autonomía” como desprendimiento-de la-
política y la dinámica del cambio apolítico asumido por los 
reformadores npm se impugnan. En contraste, la interacción entre
el gobierno democrático y la autonomía institucional se interpreta
como un aparato de los procesos de acoplamiento interinstitucional 
entre la lucha por el poder y estatus de las instituciones. El problema 
de encontrar un equilibrio estable entre el gobierno democrático, 
los organismos autónomos y las instituciones no mayoritarias, 
se ilustra con el caso del uso público de la administración y la 
universidad pública.63
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been placed at arm’s-length from direct intervention 
by political authorities. There have been structural 
devolution (vertical specialization), more single-
purpose organizations and horizontal specialization, 
and separation of the state’s roles as owner, 
administrator, regulator, purchaser, and provider.1
‘Agencification’ has come together with a general
institutional detachment from democratic government 
and politics. There has been a development from
‘Old Public Administration’ to ‘New Public 
Management’ (Dunleavy and Hood 1994) and from 
direct government intervention to a regulatory state
(Majone 1996, Rhodes 1996, Pierre and Peters 2000,
Gilardi 2008). Non-majoritarian institutions, not 
directly accountable to governments, ministries, voters
and elected representatives, have been given more
autonomy, and it has been argued that the single
most important dimension along which institutions 
vary is their degree of independence from the political 
process (Majone 1998: 25). 
Reforms have primarily been justified in terms of 
substantive performance and good government. Key
words have been efficiency, adaptation to citizens’ 
demands, better management, modernization, compe-
titiveness, prosperity and progress. The detachment-
from-politics trend, however, has implications for
the public sector’s core normative and organizational 
principles and potentially challenges the territorial 
state as the key political actor, community and basis
of solidarity. Historically the scope and organization of 
the public sector have been contested, and this essay
aims to make sense of the processes through which 
institutions, democratic government included, 
achieve or lose autonomy or primacy and why it is
difficult to find a state of equilibrium between 
institutional autonomy and democratic government. 
First, there is the question of what ‘autonomy’ 
means and what phenomena the term refers to for
reformers and how they justify claims for autonomy.
Competing conceptions are discussed and the 
usefulness of ‘autonomy’ for analytical purposes is
questioned. Second, an institutional framework is
presented as a supplement to the explanatory frames
currently most popular. Third, while autonomy reforms 
involve a variety of entities (administrative agencies, 
courts of law, central banks, regulatory agencies, audit
agencies, universities, hospitals, etc.),the analytical 
framework is applied to two institutional settings: 
public administration and the public university. 
Finally, some hypotheses are presented regarding 
the shifting balance between democratic government 
and autonomous agencies and non-majoritarian 
institutions. 
aUToNoMy: a MULTI-facETED coNcEPT 
The demand for autonomy has been embraced by 
many. There is, however, no agreement about the 
precise meaning and desirable scope of autonomy. 
Neither is there agreement about the processes 
through which, and the conditions under which, 
autonomy is gained, maintained or lost, nor which
normative and organizational principles’ ‘autonomous’ 
entities should be governed and which decisions 
should be made. 
conceptualizing autonomy 
Auto nomos, referring to the Ancient Greek city-
state implies self-governing and the right to organize 
one’s internal affairs and give the law to oneself 
without external interference. Much later the term 
was linked to the European territorial state. The 
meaning of the term has, however, been modified by
several historical developments, raising issues 
about autonomy for whom, from whom, in what 
respects, how, and why? Three key processes have 
been observed: 
•	 Individualization and the claim that the moral and
reflexive individual person has a standing 
independent of government. Individuals have rights,
immunities and freedoms and they are capable
of making individual, responsible decisions. 
•	 Institutional differentiation and functional 
specialization and the right of institutions to 
function according to their own normative and 
organizational principles and behavioral logics, 
and a similar right for specific groups (estates, 
corporations, guilds, professions). 
•	 Internationalization and the emergence of the 
European Union, making states, institutions and
individuals accountable to international and 
European regimes and law, and raising the issues, 
who are legitimate participants, what is the 
appropriate level to exercise public authority and
power and how the borders of political 
community should be drawn. 
‘Autonomy’ as self-governing and not being subject 
to the external influence of any person, institution, 
state or supranational entity then applies to several
units and raises questions about what the relations
between competing conceptions of autonomy are, and
whether different types of collective self-governance 
enhance or prohibit other types of collective and 
individual autonomy. We are interested in de-facto,
and not solely legal, autonomy. Formal-legal 
organization often represents broad categories that
allow considerable variation in practice, while de-facto
autonomy involves both the absence of external 
interference and the capability of an agency or insti-
tution to exploit available spaces to maneuver. What,
then, does ‘autonomy’ mean, and what does it refer to,
in recent market-and-management autonomy reforms? 
1. Christensen and Lægreid 2001, 2006a, 2007a, Thatcher and Stone-Sweet 
2002, 2003, Pollitt 2003, Pollitt et al. 2004, Verhoest, Peters, Bouckaert and 
Verschuere 2004, Yesilkagit and van Thiel 2004, Verhoest, Bouckaert and 
Peters 2007.J
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selective autonomy 
The stylized argument of autonomy reforms inspired
by the New Public Management (npm) and neo-
liberal economic theory is that increasingly complex,
dynamic and competitive societies require more
organizational flexibility and professional management. 
Existing forms of public-sector organization and 
government are hierarchical, rule-bound and 
excessively rigid. They hamper performance, 
adaptability and competitiveness. Therefore, 
government and formal-legal rules and procedures 
that are binding for the public sector as a whole should 
have a less prominent role and detailed regulations 
and micro-managing should in particular be avoided.
Otherwise competitive selection will make public 
administration outdated and increasingly irrelevant.2
The public sector is primarily about providing 
services, managing resources efficiently, and securing
a return on public investment. Focus is on substantive 
results, meeting performance targets and improving 
scorecards. Because market competition in the public 
sector is less than perfect and environments are not
completely deterministic, there are constraints to 
be handled and opportunities to be exploited. 
Discretion has to be delegated to professional 
managers and executive boards, and the mantra is 
‘let the managers manage’ or ‘make the managers 
manage’. Success is perceived as depending on 
entrepreneurship and the ability to secure learning, 
adaptation, flexibility and innovation. 
Professional management requires control over
those providing services, as well as autonomy from
government, and the rhetoric of autonomy coincided
with the reporting duties of an ‘audit society’ (Power
1994). Because all actors are self-interested, 
sophisticated managerial control systems, quantified
performance indicators and control staffs are 
needed. Authority based on professional knowledge
is subordinated to managerial authority based upon
formal position. External quality control is emphasized 
and specific agencies occupied with the ranking and
rating of public services achieves a central role, 
even if their operations involve unsolved problems 
(Dickson, Hood and Jones 2008). 
npm reforms promote a generic model across the 
public sector, based upon a vision of the primacy of
the private commercial enterprise in competitive 
markets, populated by rational individual managers 
and consumers, mastering the world through 
calculation, and governed by economic incentives 
more than by law or norms. Other institutions have 
auxiliary functions: to serve the economy and help 
markets function better (oecd 1991, World Bank 
2002). 
Reforms prescribe that public administration must 
adapt to ‘society’s needs’, understood as market 
forces, customers’ and stakeholders’ preferences. It 
is claimed that there is a tension between general 
rules and the flexibility requirements of economic, 
technological and social modernization, and primacy
is given to innovation and change. Reformers give
less attention to the value of continuity and the need 
to buffer over-adaptation to short-term fluctuations 
and ‘the follies of the day’ (March and Olsen 1989, 
Olsen 2008b). 
Prescriptions, however, have internal tensions. The
logic of independent regulatory agencies requires
insulation from rent-seeking, special interest groups
and corporatist arrangements that may capture 
agencies and create costs and inefficiencies, and also
from short-term swings in public opinion and 
alleged myopic elected representatives who focus 
on the next election. While public sector-wide rules 
are criticized as dysfunctional, the regulatory logic 
portrays sector and institution-specific rules as 
instruments for correcting market failures. Stable 
and predictable public rules make private flexibility 
possible. ‘Rules rather than discretion’ are seen to
create credible commitments, consistency and 
efficiency and the necessary distance from political 
and market actors (Kydland and Prescott 1977, 
Majone 2001). For example, independent central 
banks, as the guardians of a non-inflationary 
monetary policy are assumed to produce more 
efficient macroeconomic outcomes, and regulatory 
agencies are supposed to implement, monitor and
enforce rules on the basis of professional (economic, 
managerial) knowledge.
Autonomy reforms then have propagated a 
selective, and not always consistent, conception of
‘autonomy’ over the last few decades. Reforms have
reflected the triumph of market-management 
ideology and a shift towards doctrines of economic 
laissez-faire, government non-interference, and 
‘governance without government’ (Rhodes 1996, 
Pierre and Peters 2000). In an era when the Zeitgeist
has been anti-political and prescribed the self-
regulating market as society’s key institution, main-
stream reforms have celebrated individualism and 
internationalism, ‘good government’ as policy 
performance, individual choice and voluntary 
exchange, competition, and entrepreneurs and 
consumers governed by supply and demand, prices,
2. While I use a stylized model of the dominant reform trend, most reforms involve 
a mix of ideas and not all of them are market-and-management inspired. I have
taken part in three Norwegian governmental commissions on autonomy reform. 
In one, A Better Organized State (NOU 1989: 5), there were tensions between 
advocates of hierarchical organization, bargaining arrangements, and market 
competition. The second, on the administration of courts of law (The Courts of
Law in Society, NOU 1999: 13), focused on formal-legal autonomy from the
Ministry of Justice. It was initiated by judges, chaired by the President of the
Supreme Court, and had modest elements of npm thinking. The same is true
for the third, (Academic Freedom. Individual Rights and Institutional Management 
Needs, NOU 2006: 19). Its mandate emphasized formal-legal aspects of 
autonomy, but a conclusion was that limited resources, more than legal rules, 
represented a threat to academic autonomy and freedom. 65
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incentives, private contracts, and economic 
knowledge, within a framework of a regulatory state,
constitutionalism and separation of powers. Reformers 
have largely ignored variations in institutional 
identities, behavioral logics and procedural rationalities. 
They have been skeptical to a strong, intervening 
state, general rules and ‘good government’ defined 
as procedural rationality, ‘bureaucracy’, (some types
of) professional self-governance, and corporatist 
arrangements –a reform package more alien to 
Scandinavia and Continental Europe than to the 
United States. 
Arguably, reformers conceptualize ‘autonomy’ as
a management tool for achieving efficiency. They 
use the term for a transfer from one set of external 
dependencies (political, legal, bureaucratic) to another 
(markets, managers, ‘stakeholders’, external rating 
and ranking entities), rather than insulation from all
external influence. This conception hides more than
it reveals. The multidimensional and contested 
character of ‘autonomy’ and ‘accountability’ (Roness
et al. 2008, Schillemans 2008), the many combinations
observed, and the fact that different dimensions of 
autonomy are not necessarily positively correlated 
(Christensen 2001, Verhoest, Peters, Bouckaert and
Verschuere 2004) make it problematic to draw 
conclusions about change in autonomy beyond a 
single relationship (parent ministry and agency), 
subject matter (organization, budget, personnel, policy),
or instrument (legal rules, economic incentives). 
Because there is no common metric for summarizing 
across all relevant dimensions, the term may be less
fruitful as an analytical tool for understanding public
sector dynamics than as a vehicle for political 
purposes. ‘Autonomy’ is potentially a useful term 
because it carries positive overtones and at the same
time is ambiguous and leaves room for alternative 
interpretations. 
Therefore, rather than seeing reforms solely as
functional improvement, modernization and good
government, it may be worthwhile to explicitly consider
the tensions involved and explore how the politics 
of legitimate forms drive institutional change (Powell 
and DiMaggio 1991). The next part suggests that 
reforms can be understood as part of a continuous 
struggle for a place in the larger institutional order.
Reforms involve attempts to legitimize and 
delegitimize and shape and re-shape institutions, 
change their status and power, and affect what kind 
of political and social order will develop. 
fRaMEs of INTERPRETaTIoN 
Attempts to make sense of autonomy reforms have 
been dominated by two frames, both using an 
instrumental language of functional improvement to 
describe, explain and justify reform. Organizational 
forms have been assessed according to their 
expected substantive results and how ‘practical’ and 
‘suitable’ they are expected to be. 
Change is society-driven or government-driven. 
The first assumes priority for societal dynamics and 
argues that autonomy reforms are dictated by the 
functional requirements of social transformations 
and an increasingly complex and dynamic society. 
Change reflects the empirical characteristics of 
a changing world and autonomy is a necessary 
consequence of economic and technological 
globalization, long-distance migration, demographic 
and cultural change. Democratic politics is not a
‘master sphere’ in the Aristotelian meaning of having
authority and capability to establish institutions, 
protect their identity and proper role, and draw 
institutional boundaries. 
The second –embedded in the Enlightenment’s 
belief in the key role of human will, understanding 
and control in political and societal developments– 
maintains that reforms result from deliberate political 
delegation. The primacy of democratic politics is 
assumed. Government is the architect of political order, 
designing, reforming and eliminating institutions,
and the democratic logic assumes priority for political 
contestation, the electoral system and political 
representatives. Autonomy involves a distinct mode
of ruling. Institutions and actors are given autonomy 
in order to promote the common interest, as 
interpreted by government and legislature. Agencies
are not fully independent. Their status is defined in
public law. The ministry can alter their budgets and
main goals, and delegated autonomy can be recalled,
for agencies as well as non-majoritarian institutions. 
In practice, the two frames are often combined, 
as government policy is presented as responses to
societal change. The paper, however, adds a third
frame, giving priority to the organizing role of
institutions. An institutional approach, as understood 
here, sees institutions as having a partly autonomous
role and independent explanatory power. Institutions
are not epiphenomena that mirror predetermined 
individual preferences and initial resources or societal 
imperatives. They are not simply equilibrium 
contracts among self-seeking, calculating individual
actors or arenas for contending social forces and
circumstances (March and Olsen 1989, 2006b).3 
Their organization makes a difference and each 
organizational form mobilizes a bias. Each facilitates
and denies access to different actors, issues,
arguments, conflicts, and resources (Schattschneider
1960, Cohen, March and Olsen 1972, Egeberg 2006a). 
However, individual institutions are placed in a 
larger, more or less legitimate political and social 
order, and their performance and legitimacy are 
affected by their interdependencies and relations to 
other institutions. Change in the institutional order 
3. This perspective differs from Lijphart’s (1977) more society-centered analysis 
of consociational democracies, where institutional autonomy is rooted in 
segmental cleavages and verzuiling of society. J
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affects the likelihood that issues and conflicts will 
be dealt with inside or outside the political system, 
the relative importance of different institutions and 
interests, and substantive outcomes. 
One implication is that we have to take into 
account complex inter-institutional relations and not
a single principle-agency relation. Another implication 
is that the normative attractiveness and viability of a
political order are not necessarily based upon 
concerns about economy and efficiency. A democratic 
order cannot rely on a single-indicator measure of 
success. A legitimate order has to achieve citizens’ 
support and accommodate a variety of success 
criteria. Reforms raise questions such as, how should
authority and power be allocated, exercised and 
controlled and according to what normative 
standards is legitimate power to be defined? Involved 
are the power of the state, the power over the state, 
and the opportunities and constraints within which 
institutions and groups are expected to operate. 
Most importantly, democratic government has to
prevent destructive conflicts, societal chaos and 
breakdowns, and an enduring theme in political 
philosophy is how (a) legitimate government and 
(b) limited government and avoidance of power 
concentration are interrelated and legitimacy depends
on balancing political and societal power. Beginning
with the separation of state and church, which 
contributed to both secular government and church
freedoms, successful conflict regulation has been 
linked to century-long processes through which new
institutions have split off from older ones and 
developed different identities and degrees of 
autonomy, validated by society at large: democratic
politics, public administration, law, the judiciary, 
civil society, market economy, religion, science, art,
and the family. Institutions have co-evolved as part of
the historical development of democratic government 
and societies. There has been privatization or 
depoliticization of some institutional spheres, 
representation and participation of organized societal 
interests in public policy-making and administration,
and development of impartial, ‘guardian’ institutions. 
Therefore, it is of some value to get history right
and not start out with an assumed sovereign, 
monolithic state with centralized command and control
and delegation and accountability as dominant 
processes. Exempting agencies and institutions from 
central, ministerial control is a well-established 
phenomenon in many countries (Olsen 1983, Carpenter
2001, Christensen 2001, Wockelberg 2003). Sweden, 
for example, has a centuries’ long tradition of formal 
autonomy (Larsson 1994, Wockelberg 2003) and the 
phenomenon is also well known in countries that 
are often portrayed as ‘agency laggards’, such as 
Germany (Döhler 2002, Bach and Jann 2008). 
There has been change over time. There have been
periods of legitimate institutional order based upon
shared understandings of, and trust in, normative
and organizational principles, institutional purposes, 
inter-institutional relations, and appropriate use of
discretion and resources. Formal arrangements 
and informal understandings have, however, been 
incrementally adjusted in the light of experience and
there have been periods of reorientation and 
institutional breakdown. Existing orders have been
challenged and upset, with attempts of emancipation, 
encroachment, and defense of institutional identity 
and position in the institutional order (Olsen 2008b).
Institutionalization, de-institutionalization, and 
re-institutionalization have taken place as the 
legitimacy of old institutional identities and borders 
have been challenged and new institutions and 
relationships have been established, generating new
forms of integration and separation, new power 
and status relationships and forms of dominance and
accountability.4 For example, in some contexts 
and historical periods democratic politics and 
government have been seen to have a legitimate 
ordering function, determining the relations between
society’s basic institutions. In other contexts and 
periods there have been reduced trust in, and flight 
from, democratic politics and government, and the
importance of other institutions and actors has been 
emphasized. 
An institutional approach then supplements a 
conception of institutional change as technical-
functional improvement by a conceptualization of 
reform as part of a continuous inter-institutional 
struggle for legitimacy and support. Autonomy 
results not from a single process of environmental 
necessity or strategic choice. Change is an artifact 
of several (often) loosely coupled path-dependent 
processes and the flowing together of, for example, 
a desire to relieve political leaders and ministries of
time-consuming and boring tasks or political blame, 
legal doctrines of court autonomy and individual 
rights, neo-liberal economic doctrines, npm 
ideology, and financial managers and central banks, 
scientists and universities, as well as religious 
movements and churches, struggling for a more 
central place in the institutional order. 
Institutionalism shares with the government-
driven approach the idea that demands for more 
(or less) autonomy are related to discontent.
4. Institutionalization is both a process and a property of organizational 
arrangements. Institutionalization as a process implies that an organizational 
identity is developed and legitimacy in a culture is built. There is increasing clarity,
agreement and formalization of: (a) behavioral rules, including allocation of 
formal authority; (b) how rules are to be described, explained and justified; and
(c) what legitimate resources are in different settings and who should control 
common resources. De-institutionalization implies that existing rules and 
practices, descriptions, explanations and justifications, and resources and powers
are becoming contested and possibly discontinued. There is increasing uncertainty, 
disorientation, and conflict. New actors are mobilized. Outcomes are more
uncertain, and it is necessary to use more incentives or coercion to make people 
follow prescribed rules. Re-institutionalization implies either retrogression or a 
transformation from one order into another, constituted on different normative 
and organizational principles (Olsen 2008b). 67
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Performance and legitimacy crises make possible
interventions and changes otherwise not acceptable.
In eras of transition, shared vocabularies, accounts, 
and normative standards are called into question. 
Frames of mind change as actors test out ideas about
whom they and others are and can become; how 
common affairs are and can be organized and 
governed; how specific institutions are to be run and
by whom; and how institutions can be made to fit
together in a democratic order. It then becomes 
evident that the meaning of concepts such as
‘autonomy’ and ‘good government’ is not an inherent
property; it changes over time as part of the processes
of interaction and reconceptualization (March and
Olsen 1976, 1995, March 1981, Ball, Farr and Hanson 
1989).5 
How, then, do citizens and officials develop and 
lose confidence in institutions or political systems? 
For example, why is there change in the ideological 
climate so that market liberalization, managerialism, 
a regulatory state, and institutions insulated from 
politics are celebrated (Verhoest, Peters, Bouckaert 
and Verschuere 2004)? How do decision-makers 
come to believe that European interests are best 
protected by non-majoritarian institutions such as 
the European Commission, the European Court of 
Justice, the European Central Bank, or autonomous 
agencies? How are such trends reversed? 
An institutional approach assumes that both crises
and routine events are interpreted through 
institutional lenses. People identify with, and have 
trust in, different institutions and coordination 
mechanism, such as hierarchy, markets and price
systems, voting arrangements, corporatist bargaining,
rule-systems, and expertise-based entities. Identi-
fication and trust in turn influence interpretations.
For example, interpreting the 2008 financial crisis, 
market skeptics were more likely to blame socially 
irresponsible financial leaders and bankers, largely 
unregulated private equity and hedge funds, and 
credit-rating agencies. Market enthusiasts were 
more likely to blame politicians and wrongheaded 
government policies, incompetent regulators, and 
‘bureaucrats’.6
Some institutional mechanisms are well known. 
There is sequential attention to problems and success
criteria (Cyert and March 1963). Reforms are often
‘oversold’. Reformers promise too much or generate 
countervailing forces because they purify a single 
principle, be it autonomy-control, decentralization-
centralization, or specialization-coordination 
(Kaufman 1956, Jacobsen 1964, Verhoest, Bouckaert
and Peters 2007). Change may follow from increased 
interaction and exposure to new experiences, for
example through cooperation in the EU (Olsen 2007a, 
2008b) and it makes a difference what resources are
mobilized behind different prescriptions and 
interpretations. For example, many international 
financial institutions have imposed, or made a 
condition for partnership, a neo-liberal conception 
of ‘good government’ based upon the primacy of 
markets and npm managerial principles and the 
Maastricht Treaty made independent central banks 
a precondition for entry into the single currency 
(Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002: 13). 
Change in autonomy also depends on how formal
authority and power are used in practice. Self-restrain 
has been part of a civilizing process changing 
institutions and human actors (Elias 1994), and 
restraint affects variations in suspicion or trust in 
institutions. Good government implies exercising 
authority and power in accordance with fairly stable
principles, approved procedures and recognized 
authority, for example impartiality (Rothstein and 
Teorell 2008). Leaders as well as non-leaders are 
supposed to be governed by rules of appropriate 
behavior in specific roles, and situations and 
procedural rationality are based on the intrinsic merit 
of specific procedures. There is no proven right or 
superior result beyond what is generated through 
a specific process (e.g. democratic election, market 
competition, force-free deliberation, bureaucratic 
rule-following or lottery). Yet what is appropriate in 
one institutional sphere is inappropriate in others 
and inter-institutional tension is a source of political 
change (March and Olsen 1989, 2006a,b, Olsen 
2007a). 
It is beyond this essay to systematically analyze
variations across polities and institutional spheres.
The next two parts limit themselves to an illustration 
of the approach sketched above by addressing two 
favorite targets of reform: first, models of public 
administration and hence ‘the bureaucracy’ and, 
second, Humboldt’s vision of the University –two old
European institutions with Prussian roots. While 
autonomy reform is not a new phenomenon, the three
last decades represent a potentially transformative 
period with major efforts to change autonomy 
–patterns– efforts with different starting points, 
reform elements, trajectories and outcomes. We 
attend to the diagnoses and recipes of reformers, 
characteristics of the institutions intervened in, and 
results achieved. 
5. Manipulation of the meaning of “bank”, which allowed financial institutions 
to circumvent existing regulations because they were not “banks”, contributed to 
the financial crisis. 
6. The two anonymous reviewers suggested that confidence in self-regulating 
markets will come under sustained attacks due to the financial crisis. One of them 
also asked whether the analytical perspective of the paper allows predictions 
about institutional reactions (and outcomes). An institutional approach views 
performance crises as favoring change. Nevertheless, this approach also has to 
take into account that the market-ideology is embedded in strong institutions 
and supported by powerful actors. Many public and private actors admit that the 
current crisis represents a major system failure. Yet they also reconfirm that they 
still believe that market systems in the long-run will provide the best results. 
My expectation is that the market-ideology will loose some of its hegemony. 
Nevertheless, if the crisis does not increase or last for an extended time, there 
is likely to be incremental institutional modifications rather than institutional 
revolutions.J
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MoDELs of PUBLIc aDMINIsTRaTIoN 
Prügelknabe number one for npm reforms is ‘the
bureaucracy’ and the criticism has both an agenda 
aspect and an institutional aspect. For many reformers
‘bureaucracy’ means an overly large and intervening 
public sector, a centralized top-down command and 
control-model characterized by hierarchy and rules, 
or simply everything that is wrong with the public 
sector. Main stream autonomy reforms give priority
to privatization and detachment from politics, 
managerial discretion over rule-bound behavior and 
results over procedures. They open up the public 
sector to competitive markets and partnerships with 
societal actors.7
Reforms, therefore, challenge a well-established 
understanding of what the public sector is for and 
how it should be organized and governed as part of 
a democratic order. A politically accountable, rule-
driven, professionally competent and neutral public
administration has for some time been a cornerstone 
of the European state and a dominant model has 
been Weberian bureaucracy, emphasizing the value 
of efficiency, coherence, consistency, continuity and 
predictability. Compared to the 1960s, celebrating 
the intervening welfare state as the planner of society 
and ‘mixed economy’ as an alternative to market 
economy (for example in Scandinavia) reforms also
challenge the role of the state as the dominant actor
and structure and provide a new test of the power of
the political center. The outcome of such reforms, 
however, depends on how well reformers understand 
and control the ‘bureaucracy’s’ organization and 
operation. 
Weberian bureaucracy 
A Weberian bureaucracy signifies an institution with
a raison d’être of its own, based upon a clear 
distinction between the public and private sectors
(Weber 1978). Bureaucracy is a composite 
organizational form founded on three legitimate, yet 
competing principles: 
•	 Hierarchical authority based on formal position, the 
electoral mandate given by citizens at the ballot
box, and expressed through representative 
government. 
•	 Rule-based authority embedded in constitutions, 
Rechtsstaat principles, and laws authored by the 
legislature and interpreted by the courts. 
•	 Expert authority based on specialization and
professional, impartial and non-partisan knowledge, 
and principles of enlightened government. 
Bureaucrats are expected to be loyal to elected leaders, 
but not a tool for executing arbitrary commands. In
applying the law to individual cases, public 
administration is to be ‘autonomous’ –legally insulated 
from day-to-day interference by elected leaders, 
political parties, organized interests, and individual 
citizens. Bureaucrats are supposed to be the servants 
and guardians of legal and professional rules, to 
illuminate all aspects of public policies, and be 
insensitive to immediate political and economic 
expediency. The bureaucracy, nevertheless, is 
embedded in a larger order and system of 
expectations. The legislature/executive, the courts, 
and the University are gatekeepers who regulate 
relations between public administration and the 
public (Olsen 2008a). 
Democratic order 
What is usually called ‘democracy’ is a form of 
ordered rule involving an institutional sphere with 
the task of governing a territory and population. 
Political institutions have some autonomy from 
other spheres of society, absorptive and adaptive 
capabilities, and internal differentiation and 
coordination of offices and roles with specified 
authority and responsibility (Huntington 1968). 
Democracy is based on the logic of equality and a 
decisive role of the common people. It is a system 
of rights, as well as an instrument for attaining pre-
established goals and a framework for developing 
and transmitting democratic beliefs (Dahl 1998). 
However, democracies have not inherited a 
coherent set of principles and institutions that define
good government and administration. They have 
inherited elements from different traditions. Over 
time democratic compromises and struggles have 
been encoded into configurations of interdependent, 
but partly autonomous, institutions based on 
competing normative and organizational principles 
and with separate origins, histories and dynamics, and
balancing autonomy and democratic control is 
related to the question: In a world of competing 
rationalities, conceptions of truth and rivaling 
justices, which rationality and whose justice will 
prevail (MacIntyre 1988)? 
In this perspective authority and power founded 
on competitive elections and numbers are not a 
totally dominant democratic value. It is balanced 
against institutionalized individual and minority 
rights that prescribe limits of public intervention and
citizens’ obedience. Neither can it be assumed that
a single center is capable of reforming the public
sector at will so that autonomy is solely a question of 
political delegation and accountability. Representative 
governments are neither omnipotent nor impotent 
and the significance of numerical strength in 
administrative history has shifted. Relationships 
have gone through ebbs and flows and variations in
political power and administrative autonomy have
7. The selective, shifting and conditional character of administrative and
institutional autonomy is illustrated by the contrast between the current mantra 
“let the managers manage” and the criticism of public administration 30 years 
ago. Then the need to restore the rule of law and legal enforcement capacity 
was emphasized, against the tendency to delegate powers to administrative 
agencies without clearly defined legal standards of implementation (Lowi 1979). 69
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been related to political saliency and the level of 
conflict in society (Jacobsen 1964, Christensen 2003).
It has been difficult to legitimately delegate decisions 
to agencies and non-majoritarian institutions when 
issues are contested and mandates, goals, rules and 
procedures are not specified in some detail (Majone 
1998). 
While a society-driven perspective underestimates
political power, a government-driven perspective 
overestimates the power of reformers. Both 
underestimate the autonomy of law and that a 
weakening of formal-legal affiliations to central 
authorities stands in contrast to legal control and
judicial review, with courts of law defending 
individuals against abuse of discretionary 
administrative power. The principles of the rule of
law (and not managers) and due process have 
historically been an emancipatory force that constrains
arbitrary discretion. The instrumental view of law as
externally imposed discipline, dominant in autonomy
reforms, has also been supplemented with the idea 
of law as justice –rules with a defensible normative 
content, defining appropriate behavior, generating 
pressure for compliance, and possibly changing 
identities and collective understandings (Berman 1983, 
Habermas, 1998). Still, the possibility that law may be
corrupted by economic, class, religious and political
interests and by the judiciary has also been observed
(Habermas 1996: 172). Actually, since the ancient
Greeks it has been debated in what respects law, as 
a method for governing human cooperation and
conflict resolution, has developed into an autonomous
sphere with a distinctive identity, internal order and 
history, and to what extent law is integrated into
other institutional spheres (Foxhall and Lewis 1996). 
The issue is relevant because autonomy reforms 
have come together with an international rule 
explosion (Ahrne and Brunsson 2004), a rights 
revolution (Sunstein 1990), and a global expansion of
judicial power (Tate and Vallinder 1995), and because
the interaction between economic, legal and political
institutions is crucial to understanding European 
transformations. While market freedoms have gained
an overriding constitutional-like status in the European
Union, the eu is constituted and integrated through 
partly autonomous legal processes. Understanding 
the law as an epiphenomenon of political will, 
economic and social forces, or in terms of judicial 
autonomy (law as governed exclusively by legal 
doctrines and techniques of interpretation), is 
perceived as naive and uncompromising 
understandings. The dynamics of law is analyzed as 
part of larger inter-institutional processes (Joerges 
1996, Armstrong 1998, Sand 2008), a perspective that 
also sheds light on reform outcomes. 
Uncertain outcomes 
Public administration has been encroached on by an
alien institutional logic and account of how it works
and should work, and there could be a long-term 
transition to a new order, as institutions and levels 
of governance are reconceptualized, gain and lose 
legitimacy, and become more closed or open to 
external influences. European institutions may be 
entering a stage with new internal and external 
divisions of authority, power and accountabilities. 
The political executive in Europe is changing 
(Egeberg 2006a, Curtin and Egeberg 2008) and a new 
multi-level and multi-centered polity is emerging in 
the interplay between the internal dynamics of each 
institution and international, European, national, and
local processes (Olsen 2007a). An institutional 
approach, however, predicts that well-entrenched 
bureaucracies are not easy prey for societal forces or
deliberate reforms. 
Reforms include elements of centralization, 
contracts and monitoring as well as decentralization, 
managerialism and autonomy and it is an empirical 
question whether administrative entities have 
achieved more de-facto autonomy, and with what 
effects, or whether there is more market, societal and
political control. While agencification tends to make
signals from the political center less important 
(Egeberg 2003, Egeberg and Trondal 2008), there has
not necessarily been a general loss of democratic 
power, and elected leaders may even have tightened
the grip on public administration. Reform trajectories
and outcomes have varied across countries, 
institutional spheres and have been affected by 
traditions and practices in specific countries 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2006b, 2007a, b, 2008). 
Reforms have contributed to increased attention 
to the results achieved by the public sector. Functional 
superiority and efficiency gains are, however, 
difficult to prove (Verhoest, Peters, Bouckaert and 
Verschuere 2004, Christensen, Lægreid and Stigen 
2006). The conditions under which institutional 
arrangements work as intended are not well 
specified and there is weak evidence regarding the
claims of improved ability to learn, adapt and 
compete. While ‘autonomy’ is often interpreted in 
legal terms, formal-legal affiliation is an uncertain 
predictor of how autonomy is used in practice and 
it is necessary to go beyond the formal powers of 
government and agencies in order to understand 
how their relations work in practice (Larsson 1994,
Pollitt 2003, Christensen and Lægreid 2007b, Yesilkagit 
and Thiel 2008). For example, practice deviates from
the regulatory rhetoric’s prescription of autonomy 
from political and market actors (oecd 1997, 2002a, 
b). Signals from different sources are taken into 
account, including the parent ministry and those 
regulated (Christensen and Lægreid 2007b, 2008). 
In Norway there is long tradition for using the
central authorities’ right and obligation of instruction 
and organization with reason in order to find the 
‘right’ balance between democratic control and 
institutional independence (Forvaltningskomiteen J
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1958, nou 1999: 13, Christensen 2003). In many 
institutional settings it has nevertheless been difficult
to find a stable equilibrium (Egeberg 2006b, Lægreid,
Verhoest and Jann 2008). For example, a study of
Norwegian hospital reform shows that balancing 
political control and health enterprise autonomy is
precarious. Reform goals were to enhance 
coordination and efficient resource utilization, and
hospitals changed from being public administration 
entities to health enterprises. Formal decentralization 
gave subordinate bodies more discretion, but also 
new performance management and reporting 
systems. Elected politicians were replaced by 
professional experts on executive boards. Still, many
aspects were not regulated by the formal framework 
and the balancing of autonomy and control was
subject to continuous interpretation and adjustment.
There were collisions between npm reform ideology
and a Norwegian tradition of governmental 
intervention and control. Within a zone of indifference 
managers could operate freely. Politicians, however, 
did not abdicate and they were particularly activated 
in sensitive issues, with popular protest against 
redistributive policies. In practice, rather than 
replacing existing arrangements, npm principles 
were added. An effort was made to integrate 
performance management into an existing trust-
based culture. Yet, as national, regional and local 
politicians were mobilized as a lobby against health 
enterprises, the state became a less cohesive and 
consistent owner and actor (Lægreid, Opedal and 
Stigen 2005, Christensen, Lægreid and Stigen 2006). 
More generally, reforms have generated 
countervailing forces and a renewed tension between
agency discretion, initiative, and flexibility and 
political accountability and control. oecd and others
call attention to how one may ensure political 
coordination, policy consistency, a coherent public 
service, guarantee accountability, and protect the 
public interest when highly political questions are 
left to autonomous experts in autonomous agencies 
(oecd 2002b). A new generation of post-npm studies
is concerned with central political capacity and 
coordination and how public administration can be
made more responsive to elected leaders 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2006a, 2007a), as well as
how giving priority to economy and efficiency may
undermine traditional public service values and 
bureaucratic virtues such as due process, fairness, 
impartiality, honesty, equity, predictability, continuity,
and democratic control (Pollitt 2003). 
speculations 
Historically, under what conditions administrative 
processes can be insulated from external influences 
remains an open question (Bendix 1977: 155). In 
addition recent reforms remind us that ‘state’ is a
historically delimited term that has been reinterpreted 
as part of major transformations throughout time
(Bendix 1968: 9), as have other terms such as
‘bureaucracy’, ‘law’, ‘democracy’, ‘good government’ 
and ‘market’. The claim that current reform patterns
are complex, changing, and not easily understood 
(Roness et al. 2008) resembles the older observation
that it is not easy to find the reasons behind each
case of administrative reform (Forvaltningskomiteen 
1958: 25, 35). 
At the rhetorical level ‘bureaucracy’ has few 
defenders. However, ‘bureaucracy’ is frequently used
as a political slogan more than an analytical concept, 
and change at the behavioral and organizational 
level is not always positively correlated with change
in rhetoric, intentions, visions and myths. It is 
possible that a highly criticized organizational form
survives because it protects central values and 
procedures and because its composite nature 
generates flexibility between hierarchical orders, 
rule-application and professional judgment rather
than excessive rigidity (Olsen 2008a). Interpretations 
of and attitudes towards autonomy reforms are also 
affected by political-administrative traditions. In a
legalistic culture, such as Germany, legality and 
law-enforcement are perceived as more important 
than economic efficiency. Change is driven by policy
substance and political leaders tend to define 
administrative autonomy as a practical solution to 
practical problems and not a question of power. 
They are not (like npm reformers) obsessed with the
problem of misuse of administrative power. Ministerial 
influence is also seen as a legitimate expression of 
the political supremacy over administrative affairs 
and not as subverting administrative expertise and 
neutrality (Döhler 2002, Bach and Jann 2008). 
Why, then, do reforms steadily create demands for
new reforms? A speculation is that it is difficult to find
a stable equilibrium between institutional autonomy 
and democratic government, not only because reforms
are contested, but also because the structural and
dynamic features of the existing institutional 
configuration are not well understood by reformers 
who assume societal determinism or deliberate political
design. Reformers misinterpret the administrative/
political/legal order they intervene in and defy a 
European heritage that has not only experienced 
the state as a threat to institutional and individual 
autonomy, but also as the guardian of autonomy. 
These speculations are elaborated by attending 
to European-level university reforms. The principle of
enlightened government and theories of bureaucracy 
and democracy give impartial expertise, merit-based
authority and academic freedom an important role. 
Nevertheless, another Prügelknabe of autonomy 
reforms is the Humboldt vision of the University. 
MoDELs of THE PUBLIc REsEaRcH UNIvERsITy 
University reforms, portrayed as ‘modernization’ have
taken place in most European countries and higher71
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education in Europe ‘have been undergoing a major
transformation’ (Eurydice 2008: 11). While there are
detectable developmental trends, no single 
predominant European model for university 
governance has emerged (Paradeise et al. 2009). In 
its diagnosis of and recipe for university reform the
eu Commission, however, comes close to the stylized
npm reform model. A standard vocabulary, 
organizational scripts and models of management 
inspired by private business and neo-liberal 
economics are imported in order to reform one of 
Europe’s oldest institutions. 
anti-Humboldt 
The diagnosis is well known. The Commission argues
that European universities do not deliver. They are 
outperformed in global competition, partly due to 
the ‘Humboldt-model’ and ivory-tower thinking. They
operate in a fast-changing environment but are
isolated from society, overregulated and under-
financed. Universities are inherently conservative 
institutions, defending their privileges, while being 
unresponsive to economic and social needs. Now 
they are to be measured in terms of productivity and
competitive performance. They must generate 
income and contribute more to Europe’s economic 
competitiveness and development. Higher education
and research are private consumer goods more than
a public good. Faculty members are service providers 
and students are consumers (Maassen and Olsen 2007). 
An important part of the recipe, summarized in
the Lisbon Declaration (April 2007), is that ‘for 
universities, the adaptability and flexibility required 
to respond to a changing society relies above all on
increased autonomy and adequate funding’. In 
several documents it is repeated that universities will
not become innovative and responsive to change
unless they are emancipated from over-regulation.
In return universities should accept full accountability
to society at large for their results. The emerging 
‘knowledge economy’ requires university autonomy,
competition and diversity, external quality assurance, 
accountability, and sustainable partnerships with the
broader community, industry, and other stakeholders.
Greater autonomy and complexity, in turn, require
flexibility in organization, professional management,
improved internal management systems and cost
control. Public authorities should not be less 
responsible for universities, but their relations to 
universities should change (Commission 2005, 2006, 
Maassen and Olsen 2007). 
Claims for autonomy are not based on a vision of 
the University as an academic and cultural institution
with a long history and identity of its own. When the
Commission argues that change should take into 
account the university’s peculiarities, the language 
is vague and overwhelmed by the dominant market-
management perspective and criticism of the 
Humboldt legacy. 
an appropriate concept or ambition? 
There are competing diagnoses and recipes defending 
the Humboldt vision. The University is a unique self-
governing institution with a core academic mission 
and mandate, not a profit-seeking enterprise, and it
must be morally and intellectually independent of 
both political authority and economic power (e.g. 
Magna Charta Universitatum 1988, Council of Europe 
2006). The University’s identity and ethos is based 
on free inquiry and truth-finding for its own sake. 
Autonomous, disinterested, critical and enlightened 
scholars in pursuit of knowledge are following the 
logics of reason and empirical evidence, decoupled 
from immediate political and economic utility, 
religious and moral concerns, received wisdom and 
traditions. 
Organizationally the community of scholars is
characterized by a loose linkage between the 
constituting units of the University and a relatively 
weak center, collegiate leadership, elected leaders, 
organization by discipline, and research-based 
instruction. Activities take place within the wider 
context of an international community of scholars 
based on competitive merit and peer review and 
self-discipline. Universities are seen as playing a
vital role in the development of the European humanist 
tradition and civilizing processes, and the intrinsic 
value of academic freedom and autonomy is part of
a cultural commitment. The state shall not intervene
and it shall prevent others from interfering in 
academic affairs. Universities have mostly proved 
capable of simultaneously answering external and
internal demands in the pursuit of free and universal 
knowledge. Within this perspective, the Council of 
Europe talks about readjustment rather than radical 
reform. 
It is difficult to imagine total university autonomy
from external influence as the norm or practice. 
Historically, the University has been exposed to many 
as well as contradictory expectations. There have 
been cycles of separation and integration as the 
boundaries between the University and political, 
administrative, military, economic, religious, ethnic
and social institutions and groups have been 
opened or closed. During the Bergen 2005 meeting 
of the Bologna process, it was also asked whether 
‘autonomy’ is an appropriate concept or ambition 
considering the central role higher education 
institutions have in present-day societies where mass 
education is a public responsibility that rests with 
governments and large investments are involved. 
Universities have to be accountable to society and 
autonomy has to be a question of degrees and 
conditions (Ullenius 2005). 
The problem is where and how the limits of 
institutional autonomy and individual freedom are 
to be drawn and the Council of Europe warns the 
University against isolation and not reacting to 
society’s changing needs. Academic freedom andJ
o
h
a
n
 
P
.
 
O
l
s
e
n
.
 
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
i
c
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
u
t
o
n
o
m
y
.
.
.
,
 
p
p
.
 
6
2
-
7
7
.
autonomy should remain a subject of continued and
open dialogues between the academic world and
society at large, and with the advent of the 
knowledge society, a new contract has to be reached
between the university and society.8 University 
reforms, furthermore, illustrate that it is important 
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate, 
desired and undesired external interventions. 
Universities want self-governance, but in order to
work well, they also need external support and good 
relations with other institutions. Many academics, 
for example in Norway, mobilized against reforms 
prescribing a looser formal –legal affiliation to the
state– a reform interpreted as reduced state 
commitment to universities. 
More autonomy or less? 
Are universities then gaining or losing de-facto 
autonomy? The European Commission, referring to
the University’s formal-legal affiliation to government, 
claims that universities have become increasingly 
autonomous in many European countries over the
last few years (Commission 2005). Others ask 
whether the European research university is just a 
historical parenthesis (Neave, Blückert and Nybom 
2006) or argue that there is ‘institutional autonomy 
with increasing dependency on outside actors’. While
there is more legal autonomy, other external 
pressures impinge on the University’s autonomy 
rather than those of the state, including external 
funding, accreditation and quality control (Bladh 
2007, also nou 2006: 19). 
As its perceived societal relevance has increased 
and higher education has expanded and become 
more costly, the University has become accountable 
to more external actors. There are shifting calls for
relevance, which parts of society the University shall
serve and in what ways. There are competing ideas 
about how universities should be organized and 
governed, who shall run them, and who will be the 
future guardians of the University as an academic 
institution. There are also struggles over what it 
takes to deserve the name ‘university’ and what the
term should signify in the future. Arguably, as reforms
have challenged the University’s institutional identity,
the international scientific community as a self-
regulating system, and research and higher education
as a specific policy sector, the University has become
a less distinct institution, partly characterized by
institutional confusion and the search for a legitimate
place within the social order (Maassen and Olsen
2007). In brief, the contemporary external 
environment invites a complex mix of independence 
and control, not easily captured by the term 
‘autonomy’. 
The University has also become more 
‘managerial’ (Amaral, Meek and Larsen 2003). While
autonomy in some respects has increased at the 
university level, there has been a shift of power from
academic personnel to elected leaders and the 
administrative apparatus. The University has evolved
from a loosely knit community of scholars to a formal
organization attempting to formulate common goals
with increasingly higher aspirations for planning 
and co-ordination, more differentiated and formalized 
organizational structures, and an increase in 
administrative staff (March and Olsen 1976, Maassen
and Olsen 2007). A key question for universities is 
whether generic, business-inspired, or university-
specific models of organization, leadership and 
governance will prevail. 
speculations 
Does this make the University more liable to identity-
changing interventions? Universities, like other
institutions, appear in exemplary and perverted 
versions. Universities are more or less governed by 
the constitutive principles of the ideal academic
institution and autonomy may be a necessary 
but insufficient condition for excellence. The 
relationships between the individual scholar, a 
specific university, and the international scientific 
community vary. The latter can play a more or less 
central role in disciplining scholars and universities. 
Autonomy for a university can be a precondition for, 
but also a threat to, individual academic freedom. 
The central leadership of universities and individual 
managers can achieve a stronger position while the 
individual researcher and teacher are afforded less 
autonomy. External intervention can follow because 
a university does not live up to academic standards, 
but protects its self-interest and privileges. Or 
intervention can be based on competing criteria of
success, for example contributions to economic 
development. 
The outcome of contemporary reforms is difficult 
to predict. The university is a composite organization 
embracing, for example, ideas about a community 
of the learned, an internal democracy, an agency for 
implementing public policies, and an enterprise in 
competitive markets (Olsen 2007b). Reforms unfold 
in the interaction between the internal dynamics of 
the University and science, international economic 
and technological developments, European, national,
regional, and local levels of government, and in the
disguise of economic, industrial, innovation, and
regional policies, as well as higher education, research,
and university policies. 
A hypothesis is that the more loosely coupled a
university is horizontally (functionally between
8. The Council of Europe has been an important arena for debate and several 
publications on university autonomy have been edited by Sjur Bergan, Head of 
the Council’s Higher Education and Research Division.73
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schools, disciplines, departments, individual 
professors), the easier to change one part without 
serious consequences for the rest, and the more 
likely that specific units will be exposed to demands 
for change. Reforms that increase the specialization 
and decentralization of authority within individual 
universities will reduce the degree of integration and
generate centrifugal forces that differentiate between
disciplines and sub-disciplines with demands for 
their teaching and research and strong support in 
society and less fortunate sub-units, making the latter 
more vulnerable to change. 
The outcome will not depend solely on formal 
organization, but also on whether there are shared
norms of Universitas as a community of the learned 
that might hold a (formally) loosely coupled university
together and make it difficult to eliminate or 
reorganize specific sub-units. Therefore, rhetoric that
de-emphasizes Universitas as a ‘whole’, arguing
that a ‘university’ does not need to encompass the 
entire spectrum of disciplines, facilitates reforms 
which aim to eliminate or change individual units. The
more the common academic culture is weakened, 
the easier to implement change. 
Vertical integration, stronger hierarchical 
authority and administrative staffs provide increasing 
capacity for reform. Budget cuts and exposure to 
competition for short-term and specified funds have
changed universities, and the more costly and 
resource-dependent the research is, the more exposed
it is to external influence. The more earmarked the 
budgets are, the less autonomy, but also the less 
internal conflict there will be. The more lump-sum 
budgets there are, the more autonomy, but also the 
more likely that there will be internal distributional 
conflicts and power struggles over reforms. 
While the EU and it forerunners have been 
involved in university reforms to some degree 
(Corbett 2005), it should be kept in mind that ongoing 
European-level reforms are prescriptions more than
accomplishments, that EU-level institutions are (still)
more important as sources of reform ideas than as
policy-makers, and that there is a discrepancy 
between rhetoric and practice. ‘Humboldt’ (like 
‘bureaucracy’ and ‘npm’) is a stylized vision with
strong symbolic meaning (Nybom 2007) that 
historically and currently captures only part of a
reality characterized by huge variations and dynamics.
Contemporary reform rhetoric and its opponents 
talk at the level of principles for or against academic 
autonomy, markets and pricing systems, political-
administrative hierarchy, internal-representative 
democracy and bargaining arrangements. In practice 
such principles are recombined and rebalanced, rather 
than one principle completely replacing all others. The 
challenge facing universities is: ‘What university and 
academics for what society’ (Olsen 2008c). 
That is, what should be left to the discretion of 
partly autonomous institutions? What should be a
common responsibility subject to collective decision-
making at different levels of government? What 
should be commercialized and made subject to 
market competition and price systems? What balance
should be struck among political, legal, academic, 
professional and commercial values and interests? 
PRELIMINaRy coNcLUsIoNs 
This essay has questioned the analytical value of
‘autonomy’ as detachment-from-politics and the 
apolitical dynamics of change assumed by npm 
reformers; that is, reforms understood and justified 
solely in terms of their contribution to functional 
efficiency and economy and a good and sustainable 
government. In contrast, the essay has portrayed the
dynamic interplay between democratic government 
and institutional autonomy as artifacts of partly de-
coupled inter-institutional processes involving 
struggle for power and status among interdependent 
and co-evolving institutions that are carriers of 
competing yet legitimate values, interests and 
behavioral logics. The problem of finding a stable 
equilibrium between democratic government, auto-
nomous agencies and non-majoritarian institutions, 
illustrated by the cases of public administration and
the public university, has been interpreted as a 
result of the contested nature of reforms and the 
limited understanding and control reformers have 
of the institutional configurations they intervene in. 
In situations where the criteria of policy success 
are contested and the long-term performance of 
institutions are not well understood or documented, 
a hypothesis is that demands for more autonomy 
from external influence depend less on the scope of 
external interference than upon what interventions 
are perceived as inappropriate and illegitimate. 
Citizens and policy-makers in legitimate political 
orders internalize the notion that certain external 
interventions are appropriate and should be obeyed. 
The more reformers are seen as having a legitimate
ordering function and as pursuing appropriate 
goals in accordance with appropriate procedures, 
the more likely it is that reforms will be acknowledged 
as ‘self-given’; the less likely it is that interventions 
will be perceived as unwanted external intrusion, 
and the less struggle for being shielded from external 
influence. Likewise, the more agencies and non-
majoritarian institutions are seen to function 
according to predictable and socially validated 
principles, rules and interests, the less likely that there 
will be demands for reduced autonomy. 
Another hypothesis is that systems tend to 
oscillate, rather than settle into some kind of stable 
equilibrium because (part of) the dynamics of change
is rooted in enduring tensions within and among
competing institutionalized conceptions of ‘autonomy’. 
In a democracy the key role is the citizen, not the 
elected representative, and to the extent modern J
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.
democracies continue to advance individual 
autonomy and creativity, democracy will be an 
unfinished project. In fairly homogeneous polities 
citizens may be relatively willing to empower a
political center, but even they are unlikely to delegate 
total authority and power to a single institution or 
group of decision-makers. There are cycles of trust 
and identification and all actors and institutions 
accountable to citizens have an uncertain mandate. 
It will always be uncertain what authority and power
elected politicians, bureaucrats, judges, diplomats, 
military officers, scientists, experts, professions, 
capitalists, bankers, business managers, religious 
leaders, representatives of organized interests –and 
the institutions they inhabit– will have. 
To the extent that modern democracies continue
to advance institutional differentiation and functional 
specialization and make use of autonomous 
administrative agencies and non-majoritarian 
institutions, there will be dynamics of change 
generated by tensions, collisions and co-evolution 
among institutions constituted on competing 
normative and organizational principles. Because 
many institutions have in-built competing principles,
intra-institutional tension will also generate change. 
Furthermore, institutionalization of legitimate 
debate and opposition is an important source of 
innovation and change in modern democracies. 
To the extent modern democracies expand 
European and international cooperation and integration, 
there will be increasing interaction between states,
institutions, agencies and individuals across national
borders. Actors will be more exposed to competing 
problem-definitions, solutions and traditions. There
will be a more intensified search for ‘best practice’ 
and consistency, and dynamics of change will be
generated by tensions between levels of governance 
and national traditions. In a multi-level and multi-
centered polity such as the European Union, the 
meaning and desirability of ‘the political center’ will 
be contested. 
It is a tall order to understand the politics of such
interacting dynamics and the factors driving the 
emergence, maintenance and erosion of confidence 
in institutions and actors. In particular, there is a 
need to understand the conditions under which non-
majoritarian institutions such as public administration 
and universities will be able to adapt to changing 
governmental policies and societal conditions 
without losing their institutional identities and claims 
to autonomy and individual freedom. 
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